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[L. A. No. 21178. In Bank. Oct. 23, 1951.J

Estate of GEORGE OWEN KNAPP, Deceased. FREDERIC~ A. GODLEY, as Executor, etc., Appellant, v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
[1] Taxation - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation.- When a will
creates a life estate and remainder interests in the same
property, it is necessary to divide the value of the property
at the date of decedent's death between the life interests and
the remainders for purposes of inheritance taxation, and the
value of the remainders is determined by deducting the value
of the life interest from the total value of the property.
(Cal. Adm. Code, tit. 18, § 793.)
[2] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation.-Where a will creates
a life estate and remainder interests, the valuation of the
life estate serves as a measure of the tax on its own transfer
and also as the means of determining the value of the remainder interests. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13955, which provides
for valuation based on the actual duration of the life tenant's
life when he dies before determination of the tllX, is not
[1] Time as of which value is computed for inheritance tax,
note, 160 A.L.R. 1059. See, also, 24 Cal.Jur. 463; 28 Am.Jur. 117.
J4cK. Dig. References; [1,3] Taxation, § 441(2); [2,4-li.l Taxation, § 441(1); [10] Tuatioll, § 438.
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limited to determining the tax on the transfer of the life
interest, and it calls for a more accurate apportionment of
the taxes between the transfers of the life interest and the
remainders than does : 13953, which provides for valuation
based on the life t~llant's life expectancy as of the date of .
decedent's death.
'
[8] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation.-For inheritance tax
purposes, the value of a life interest is the value of that
interest as of the date of decedent's death, whether it is
determined under Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13953 or § 13955.
[4] Id.-Inheritance Ta:.:ation-Valuation.-The value of an aDnuity or estate under Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13955, is found by
discounting back to the date of decedent's death the payments paid or payable to the annuitant or life tenant while
he lived.
[6] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation.-When it is not known ~
at date of decedent's death how long an annuitant or life
tenant will live, it is necessary to resort to mortality tables to
determine the probable duration of his life j·'1lut when the
annuitant or life tenant dies before a tax of his interest is I
fixed, an annuity or estate for life has become an annuity or
estate for years, and continued use of mortality tables would
nullify the requirement of accuracy in valuation prescribed
by Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13955.
[6] Id. - Inheritance Taxatiol - Valuation. - Under the express
language of Inheritance Tax Act of 1935, § 8, subsec. 8 (Stats.
1935, p. 1279) as it then read, the valuation of a life estate
on the basis of its actual duration was made, not solely for
the purpose of taxing the transfer of that interest, but for
the purpose of taxation generally under the act j and under
the codification of that subsection in Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13955,
there is no indication that the value of the life interest as
determined under that section is not the value it should be
assigned for all purposes of inheritance taxation.
[7] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation.-The objective of Rev.
& Tax. Code, § 13952, that in the case of transfers of estates
determinable on contingency the entire property is to be
valued as of the date of decedent's death, may be achieved
by the consistent application of § 13953 to determine the value
of both the life interest and remainder interests, or by the
consistent application of § 13955 to determine the value of
the life interest and the remainder interests, if the life tenant
dies before the tax has been determined.
[8] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation.-Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 13952, will be violated if § 13955 is applied only for the
purpose of computing an inheritance tax on a life interest and
§ 13953 is applied to determine the value of the life interest
I
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for the purpose of evaluating the remainder, since in such
case the entire property by which the respective interests IIr~
supported will not be. valued as of thc date of deeedtmt's
death, but part of the entire property will eseape valuation
altogether.
[9] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation.-R.ev. & Tax. Code,
§ 13955, which provides an alternative method of evaluating
a life interest when the life tenant dies before determination
of an inheritance tax, must be used for all purposes or for
none, since in the contingency therein provided the valuation
of the life interest is removed from the operation of § 13953,
and the value of the remainder must be determined by subtracting the value of the life interest as determined under
§ 13955 from the present value of the entire property as of
the date of decedent's death.
[10] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Rates. - Where testator bequeathed an annuity from testamentary trusts to his son for
life and an annuity from the same trusts to his son's wife after
death of her husband, if she were then living, and the son died
before the inheritance tax had been determined, it was proper
under Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13411, relating to computation at the
highest rate on transfers subject to contingency or condition, to
fix the tax on the transfer of the wife's remainder interest,
since the rate with respect to her interest was higher than that
w~th respect to the interest of certain named grandchildren to
whom the remainders were to go in case of her death.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Santa
Barbara County fixing amount of inheritance tax. Ernest
D. Wagner, Judge. Affirmed.
Heaney, Price, Postel & Parma for Appellant.
James W. Hickey, Chief Inheritance Tax Attorney, Morton
L. Baker and Raymond G. LaNoue, Deputy Inheritance
Tax Attorneys, and Bert G. Wetherby, Assistant Inheritance
Tax Attorney, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-The testator, George Owen Knapp, bequeathed to his son William Jared Knapp an annuity of
$10,000 per year from each of five testamentary trusts, a total
of $50,000 per year for life. Upon William's death his wife
Louise Allen Knapp, if then living, was to receive an annuity
of $15,000 per year from eacll of the five trusts, a total of
$75,000 per year for life. Upon Louise's death, or upon William's death if Louise was not then living, thE' remainders
were to go to certain named grandchildren of the testator.

)

830

ESTATE OF KNAPP

[3'7 C.2d

In the first report tiled by the state inheritance tax appraiser
William's interest was appraised pursuant to section 139531
of the Revenue and Taxation Code, and the value of that
interest was deducted from the value of the entire property
involved at the date of the testator's death to determine the
value of the remainders. Before any action was taken by the
court on the report, William died leaving his wife Louise
surviving. The inheritance tax appraiser filed a second report
pursuant to section 13955 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code,
and the value of William's interest as determined under that
section was deducted from the entire value of the property
involved to determine the value of the remainders. In the
first report William's interest was valued at $463,161.35 and
the tax with respect thereto computed at $33,834.52. Louise's
interest was valued at $96,346.65 and the tax with respect
thereto computed at $7,534.67. In the second report William's
interest was reappraised at $99,726.03 and the tax with respect
thereto computed at $3,139.04, Louise's interest .)Vas reappraised at $546,032.04 and the tax with respect thereto
recomputed at $66,804.81.
The executor filed objections to the second report. Upon
the hearing it was stipulated that (a) at the death of William
the tax on his life interest had not been determined; and
(b) the only point in dispute related to the correctness of
the tax charged against Louise. The court overruled the
objections and entered its order fixing the inheritance tax
in accord with the inheritance tax appraiser's second report.
Prom that order the executor appeals.
[1] When, as in the present case, a will creates a life
interest and remainder interests in the same property, it is
necessary to divide the value of the property at the date of
1"The value of a future, contingent, or limited estate, income, or
interest is determined in accordance with the rules, methods, and
standards of mortality and value that are set forth in the actuaries'
combined experience tables of mortality, as extended, for ascertaining
the values of life insurance policies and annuities and for determining
the liabilities of life insurance companies, save that the rate of interest
used ill computing the present value of the estate, income, or interest
is four (4) per cent per annum." (Rev. & Tax. Code, ~ 13[)!"3.)
·"If an annuity or a life estate is terminated by the death of the
annuitant or life tenant or by the happening of a. contingency, and
the tax upon the transfer of the annuity or estate has not been determined, the value of the annuity or estate is the present value, at the
date of the transferor's death, of the amount of the annuity or income
actually paid or payable to the annuitant or life tenant during the
period he was entitled to the annuity or was in possession of the
estate." (Rev. & Tax. Code, ~ 13955.)
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the decedent's death between the life interest and the remainders for t1le purposes of inheritance taxation. This division is generally made by deducting the value of the life interest
from the total value of' the property. The difference represents the value of the remainders. (Cal. Adm. Code, tit. 18,
§ 793.) "It is the settled law of this state that the inheritance
tax is imposed upon the net clear value of what the transferee
receives, and that to ascertain this the value of what he does
not receive, in contemplation of law, must be deducted from
the value of what the decedent left." (Estate of Miller, 184
Cal. 674, 682 [195 P. 413, 16 A.L.R. 694] ; see 28 Am.Jur.,
Inheritance, Estate and Gift Taxes, § 232, p. 117; 47 Yale L. J.
1354, 1357.)
Under the foregoing rule the valuation of the life interest
serves two purposes. It serves as a measure of the tax on its
own transfer and also as the means of determining the value
of the remainder interests. The Revenue and Taxation
Code provides two alternative methods for determining its
value, one based on the life tenant's life expectancy as of the
date of the decedent's death (§ 13953), and the other based
on the actual duration of his life when he dies before the
determination of the tax. (§ 13955.) Reasonable symmetry
suggests that whatever method is used to determine the value
of the life interest for one purpose should also be used for
the other. [2] By requiring the substitution of fact for probabilities, section 13955 calls for a more accurate apportionment
of the taxes between the transfers of the life interest and the
remainders than section 13953. Section 13955 cannot reasonably be construed as limited to the purpose of determining
the tax on the transfer of the life interest alone.
Appellant agrees that since William died before the determination of the tax, his interest must be valued under section
13955. He agrees also that the value of the remainder interests is determined by deducting the value of the life interest
from the value of the entire property. He contends, however,
that in determining the value of the remainder interests, the
value of William's interest must be determined under section
13953 by reference to William's life expectancy as of the date
of decedent's death. This contention is based on the theory
that, with the exception of a life interest valued under section
13955, the statutes require that all interests be valued as of
the date of the decedent's death. Thus it is argued that if
the remainder interests are to be valued as of t.hat date, the
value of the life interest used to determine the value of the

\
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remainders must be its value as determined by the life tenant's
life expectancy at that date raUler than its value as determined
by its actual duration.
[3] This contention overlooks the fact that whether the
life interest is valued under section 13953 or section 13955,
it is still the value of that interest as of the date of the decedent's death that is being determined. Valuation as of that
date is prescribed not only by the general provisions of section
33951 8 relating to property included in any transfer, but by
the provisions of section 139524 relating specifically to an
estate or interest for a term of years or for life. Thus, the
value of a life interest determined under either section 13953
or 13955 is the value of that interest as of the date of the
decedent's death. [4] Section 13955 makes this clear by the
specific provision that "the value of an annuity or estate
is the present value, at the date of the transferor's death,
of the amount of the annuity actually paid or payable to the
annuitant or life tenant during the period he wfis entitled to
the annuity or was in possession of the estate." (Italics
added.) Such vah1{' is found by discounting back to the date
of the decedent's death the payments paid or payable to the
annuitant or life tenant while he lived.
[5] If it were known at the date of the decedent's death
exactly when the annuitant or life tenant would die, it would
be known how many years he would receive the annuity or
income specified. The annuity or estate for his life would be
equivalent to an annuity or estate for a term for years, the
value of which could be readily determined. Since no one
can know how long an annuitant or life tenant will live, it is
necessary to determine the probable duration of his life and
to translate the annuity or estate for life into an annuity or
estate for a term of years. That translation is generally
made according to the combined experience tables of mortality,
as extended, for ascertaining the value of life insurance policies and annuities. When the annuitant or life tenant dies,
'''For the purpose of this part, the value of property included in
any transfer subject to this part, whether or not the transfer was
made during the lifetime of the transferor, is the market value of
the property as of the date of the transferor's death." (Rev. & Tax.
Code, ~ 13951.)
"'In the case of a transfer of any estate, income, or interest (a) for
a term of years or for life, or (b) determinable upon any future or
contingent event, or (c) constituting a remainder, reversion, or other
expectancy, the entire property by wlJieh thE! est.ate, income, or interest
is supported, or of which it is a part, i~ Vlth'Prj as of the date of the
decedelit'. death." (Rev. & Tax. Code, ~ 13952.)

)

\

,

Oct. 1951]

)

ESTA'I'JI' 01" KNAPP
(37 C.2d 82i. 23(l P 2<1 3721

833

and it is therefore known how long he lived and how much
he received, there is no nt'ed to resort to mortality tables,
certainty has taken the place of probabilities and an annuity
or estate for life has become an annuity or estate for years.
The continued use of mortality tables would nullify the requirement of accuracy in valuation prescribed by section
13955, when the fact of the annuitant's or life tenant's death
is known before the tax upon the transfer has been determined.
[6] There is nothing expressed in the statutes or that can
be reasonably implied therefrom that would justify placing
one value on a life interest in determining the tax on its
t"ansfer and placing another value on that interest for deduction !rom the value of the entire property in determining
what the remaindermen receive. That section 13955 was not
intended to provide a method for evaluating the life interest
solely for the purpose of determining the tax on its own transfer is made clear by the provisions of subsection 8 of section 8
of the Inheritance Tax Act of 1935. (Stats 1935, p. 1279.)
Those provisions were codifit'd in section 13953 to 13955 of
the Revenue and Taxation Code.
Subsection 8 provided:
"The value of every future, or contingent or limited estate,
ineome1or interest, shall, for the purposes of this act be determined by the rule, methods and standards of mortality and
of value that are set forth in the actuaries' combined experience tables of Dlortality..•. When an annuity or a life
estate is terminated by the death of the annuitant or life tenant, and the tax upon such interest has not been fixed and determined, the value of said interest for the purpose of taxation
under this act shall be the amount of the annuity or income
actually paid or payable to the annuitant or life tenant during the period for which such annuitant or life tenant was
entitled to the annuity or was in possession of the life estate."
(Italics added.)
Thus under the express language of the statute as it
then read the valuation of the life estate on the basis of its
actual duration was to be made, not solely for the purpose of
taxing the transfer of that interest, but for the purpose of
taxation generally under the act. Similarly, under the codification of subsection 8 found in section 13955 there is no
indication that the value of the life interest as determined
under that section is not the value it should be assigned for
1'1

)
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all purposes of inheritance taxation. To hold otherwise would
create a conflict with section 13952 of the Revenue and Taxa·
tion Code, which requires that the entire property be valued
as of the date of the decedent's death. [7] That objective
may be achieved by the consistent application of section 13953
to determine the value of both the life interest and the remainder interests, if the tax is determined before the life tenant
dies, or by the consistent application of section 13955 to determine the value of the life interest and the remainder interests, if the life tenant dies before the tax has been determined.
If the present value of the entire property is divided between
the respective interests by the use of mortality tables, the
entire property will be valued as of the date of the decedent's
death. Similarly, if the present value of the entire property
is divided between the respective interests in accord with the
actual duration of the life interest under section 13955 the
entire property will still be valued as of the date of the
decedent's death. [8] On the other hand, if .Jection 13955 is
applied only for the purpose of computing the tax on the
transfer of the life interest and section 13953 is applied to
determine the value of the life interest for the purpose of
evaluating the remainder, section 13952 will be violated. In
such case the entire property by which the respective interests
are supported will not be valued as of the date of the decedent's death, but part of the entire property will escape
valuation altogether. II [9] Accordingly, section 13955 must
be used for all purposes or for none. It provides an alternative method of evaluating the life interest, when the life
tenant dies before the determination of the tax. In that
contingency the valuation of the life interest is removed from
the operation of section 13953, and the value of the remainder
mlist be determined according to the general rule by subtracting the present value of the life interest as determined under
section 13955 from the present value of th~ entire property
as of the date of the decedent's death.
[10] Since in this case the rate with respect to Louise'.
interest is higher than that with respect to the grandchildren'.
OlD the present case William's interest as determined under section
13953 had a present value of $463,161.35 based on his life expectancy
of 13.18 years. A.s determined under section 13955 William'. interest
had a present ~alue of only $99,726.03. If the value as determined
under section 13953 rnther than under 13955 is used to determine the
value of the remainder interests, approximately $363,000 of the present
value of decedent's estate as of the date of his death would esoape
valuation completely.

)
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interest, the trial court under the provisions of section 134]]
of the Revenue and Taxation Code 6 correctly fixed the tax
011 the transfer of her interest.
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion sustains the order of the probate
court under which the value of the interest of Louise, the
succeeding life tenant, which was originally computed in the
first report of the inheritance tax appraiser as of the date of
the testator's death, was recomputed in the second report
after the death of William, the first life tenant, at its then
assumed value so as to impose a greater tax on Louise's interest
than that authorized by the value of her ipterest at the date
of the death of the testator. I am of the view that there is no
statutory authority for such procedure, and that the order
of the probate court should be reversed.
The result reached in the majority opinion is there justified
on the ground that it accomplishes "reasonable symmetry"
in the valuation of the several interests. However, the question h~re is not whether the Legislature could have provided
for such revaluation of Louise's interest upon the death of
the first life tenant, but whether the Legislature has so provided. In my opinion, it has not so provided but, on the other
hand, has provided directly to the contrary.
It must be remembered that an inheritance tax is not a tax
upon property as such, as implied in the majority opinion,
but upon the privilege of succeeding to property (24 Cal.Jur.
§ 395, p. 425 j Estate of Miller, 184 Cal. 674, 678 [195 P. 413,
16 A.L.R. 694] j Estate of Watkinson, 191 Cal. 591, 597 [217
P. 1073]), and that ordinarily the value of that privilege is
to be determined as of the date of the testator's death. Thus
the general rule with respect to the valuation as of that date
(24 Cal.Jur. § 422, p. 463 j Estate of Hite, 159 Cal. 392, 395
[113 P. 1072] j Riley v. Howard, 193 Cal. 522, 528 [226 P.
393]) has been carried into the statutory provisions declaring
the date for valuation (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 13311, 13951),
·"In the case of a transfer made subject to a contingency or condition upon the occurrence of which the right, interest, or estate of the
transferee may, in whole or in part, be created, defeated, extended,
or abridged, the tax is computed as though the contingency or condition has occurred, and at the highest rate possible." (Bev. & TaL
Code, § 13411.)

836

)

ESTATE OF KNAPP

[37 C.2d

the interests which are affected (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13952),
and the method for determining the value of the particular
interests here involved according to the mortality tables (Rev.
& Tax. Code, § 13953).
It is thus recognized in the cited sections that whenever the
law deals with the valuation of the privilege of succeeding
to successive life interests, it is necessarily dealing with probabilities, and that a date must be fixed for determining the
value of such successive interests based upon such probabilities. With one single exception, the general provisions ,ll
relate to valuation as of the date of the transferor's death.
(Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 13311, 13951, 13952, supra.) That
single exception covers any life tenant who may die before
the tax is fixed (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13955), in which case
the "life estate is terminated by the death" and the value
of the interest of such deceased life tenant may be computed
with certainty. The value of the interest of any succeeding
life tenant, living at the date of the fixing of the..mheritance
tax, is not thereby rendered certain, and as to such life tenant,
it cannot be said that "certainty has taken the place of probabilities." .A:ny such succeeding life tenant might die shortly
after the order fixing the tax had become final and the tax
had been paid; and it may well be for this reason that the
Legislature has made no provision for the recomputation of
value for inheritance tax purposes based upon shifting probabilities which may ultimately prove to be very inaccurate in
forecasting subsequent events. But whatever the reason may
have been, the Legislature has not provided for any recomputation of the value of Louise's interest following the death of
William.
The majority opinion relies strongly upon the forerunner
of the above mentioned section 13955 (Stats 1935,p. 1279)
and the following phrase is quoted with the indicated emphasis: "When an annuity or a life estate is terminated by the
death of the annuitant or life tenant, and the tax upon such
interest has not been fixed and determined, the value of said
interest for the purpose of taxation under this act shall be
the amount of the annuity or income actually paid or payable
to the annuitant or life tenant during the period for which
such annuitant or life tenant was entitled to the annuity or
was in possession of the life estate." The emphasis should
have been placed upon the words "the value of said interest,"
but with or without emphasis, it is too clear to require further
discussion that neither its forerunner nor the present section
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) :1955 was or is concerned with anything other than the valuat.ion of the interest of a life tenant who may die before the
iDheritance tax may have been fixed.
While the cited statutory provisions appear to be entirely
clear upon the point here involved, it may now be assumed
solely for the purpose of this discussion that some uncertainty
exists concerning their application to the facts before us.
This assumption brings into play the well settled rule that
"Since tax proceedings are in invitum, tax laws are strictly
construed in favor of the taxpayer and against the state. . . .
Strict construction in such cases is reasonable, because presumptively the Legislature has given in plain terms all the
power intended to be exercised." (24 Cal.Jur. § 11, pp. 27-28;
see, also, Estate of Potter, 188 Cal. 55, 64-65 [204 P. 826] ;
Estate of Steekler, 195 Cal. 386, 389 1233 P. 972].) I am of
the view that this salutary rule should be followed rather than
repudiated, and that the majority opinion constitut('s a wide
departure therefrom.
I would therefore reverse the order of the probate court,
with directions to tax the interest of Louise Allen Knapp
according to its value as of the date of the death of the
testator as determined in the first report of the inheritance
tax appr,aiser.

Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied November
19, 1951. Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., voted for a
rehearing.
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